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Pêcheux’s Contribution to Discourse Analysis 
Niels Helsloot & Tony Hak ∗ 
Abstract: »Pêcheuxs Beitrag zur Diskursanalyse«. Michel PÊCHEUX (1938-
1983) was one of the main representatives of a critical and productive episode 
in French discourse analysis, from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. He shared 
with more famous contemporaries such as Michel FOUCAULT a background 
in BACHELARDian epistemology and ALTHUSSERian “post-structuralism” 
and an interest in theories of discourse, but his most important contribution to 
discourse analysis consisted in the development of tools for conducting empiri-
cal studies of discourses. In an attempt to break away from the “spontaneous 
ideology” of content analysis, PÊCHEUX developed a formal, potentially au-
tomatic instrument, which he called Automatic Discourse Analysis. This in-
strument could generate a structuralist description of a discourse by identifying 
and describing relations of selection and substitution of syntactic elements in a 
corpus of texts representing that discourse. When dealing with criticisms of 
this approach andattempting to overcome its limitations, PÊCHEUX moved 
away from structuralism and developed a more reflective theory of “interdis-
course” in which he tried to account for the ideological struggle and dynamic 
inequality between discourses. This article discusses the rationale of the differ-
ent stages PÊCHEUX went through to develop an empirical instrument of dis-
course analysis.  
Keywords: Michel PÊCHEUX, French discourse, analysis, automatic dis-
course analysis, epistemology, ideology, interdiscourse. 
1. Introduction 
In the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, Michel PÊCHEUX (1938-1983) 
was a leading figure in French discourse analysis. Initially, his renown was 
based on his first major work, Analyse automatique du discours (1969a), which 
was received enthusiastically upon its publication. This work—henceforth 
ADA69—was only the beginning of a continuous process of revising and re-
formulating the principles of discourse theory and discourse analysis. Through 
this work, PÊCHEUX became a reference point for much work on discourse 
analysis published in the 1970s and 1980s. Gradually, ADA69 and 
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PÊCHEUX’s theorising became an integral part of textbooks on discourse 
analysis.1 The significance of his work as seen in the 1980s is also evident from 
the commemorative issues of the journals Mots and Langages,2 and from De-
nise MALDIDIER’s informative and balanced anthology L’inquiétude du dis-
course.3 
Outside of France, ADA69 found ready reception especially in Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and several Latin-American countries. As early as in 1972, an exten-
sive summary of ADA69 was published in Italian (CIPOLLI, 1972). At the end 
of the seventies, a Spanish translation of ADA69 appeared (PÊCHEUX, 1978), 
which includes a critical elaboration written in 1975 (PÊCHEUX & FUCHS, 
1975, referred to as ADA75 below). This addition is also part of a Portuguese 
edition, presented with introductions and revisions, which appeared in Brazil 
(GADET & HAK, 1990). Later on, a similar collection consisting of ADA69, 
ADA75 and a series of introductions was published in English (HAK & HEL-
SLOOT, 1995). 
Until the English publication of ADA69 and ADA75 in 1995, PÊCHEUX’s 
work on discourse analysis was not available to and, therefore, not known to 
the English speaking world. In somecircles, however, PÊCHEUX was known 
as a discourse theorist or rather as a theorist of ideology. This was due to the 
impact of the English translation of his Les Vérités de la Palice (1975), which 
was published in 1982 as Language, Semantics and Ideology. This book was, 
wrongly we think, read as just another contribution to “post-structuralist” phi-
losophical discourse as presented by such authors as Jacques LACAN, Michel 
FOUCAULT and Jacques DERRIDA. Although linguistic forms of discourse 
analysis constitute the empirical counterpart of this whole philosophical tradi-
tion, these approaches did not get the attention they deserve.The result was that 
PÊCHEUX’s theoretical work used to be discussed irrespective of his contribu-
tion to discourse analysis.4 Thus, his significant contribution to the develop-
ment of empirical strategies of discourse analysis was seriously underesti-
mated, and is largely neglected even up to now. 
In this article, we highlight the intimate relationship between PÊCHEUX’s 
theoretical work and his work on the development of methods of discourse 
analysis. Pivotal to the connection between theory and analysis in PÊCHEUX’s 
                                                             
1  E.g. GHIGLIONE and BLANCHET (1991), and MAINGUENEAU (1991). 
2  Mots 9 (1984) and Langages 81 (1986); see also MALDIDIER (1984). The latter text opens 
the volume Histoire et linguistique (ACHARD, GRUENAIS & JAULIN, 1984), which is 
dedicated to the memory of Michel PÊCHEUX. 
3  MALDIDIER (1990) offers an extensive overview of PÊCHEUX’s work, including a 
complete bibliography (cf. ACHARD, 1991, and HELSLOOT & HAK, 1992 for short re-
views). We ourselves edited an anthology in Dutch translation which focuses on 
PÊCHEUX’s later works (HAK & HELSLOOT, 1991). 
4  Examples are MacCABE (1979), COUSINS (1985), MACDONELL (1986), and WIL-
LIAMS (1992). Some of the few publications in English that discuss PÊCHEUX’s work in 
relation to empirical discourse analysis are WOODS (1977) and THOMPSON (1983). 
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work was the BACHELARDian notion of the instrument as materialised the-
ory.5 This epistemological background will therefore be discussed before we 
turn to discourse analysis proper. 
2. Epistemology  
Michel PÊCHEUX studied philosophy from 1959 to 1963 at the École Nor-
male Supérieure, where Louis ALTHUSSER and Georges CANGUILHEM 
were among his teachers. Like Michel FOUCAULT and Jacques DERRIDA 
before him, he received training in BACHELARDian epistemology. The cri-
tique of current philosophies of science developed by Gaston BACHELARD 
confronted philosophy with the results of historical studies of the development 
of sciences (plural). BACHELARD’s detailed historical analyses had shown 
that the constitution of sciences such as physics was the result of theoretical 
rather than empirical breakthroughs. Because of the importance he attributed to 
theory in the constitution of sciences, his epistemology was considered anti-
empiricist. 
Epistemology formed the background for, among others, the work of ALT-
HUSSER and FOUCAULT in the 1960s, and provided those authors with their 
concepts, such as “épistémè” (FOUCAULT) and “epistemological break” 
(ALTHUSSER). BACHELARD coined the latter concept in reference to the 
distinction between “common” knowledge and scientific knowledge, i.e. be-
tween knowledge based on everyday experience and knowledge based on ex-
perimental technique (BACHELARD, 1949, p.102). In his terms, the distinc-
tion between these two modes of knowing is “philosophically decisive”: “What 
is at stake is nothing less than the primacy of reflection over perception. [...] 
What mankind makes by means of a scientific technique does not exist in na-
ture and is not even a natural result of natural phenomena.”6 Experimental 
evidence is constituted or produced:  
[P]henomena must be selected, filtered, purified, shaped by instruments; in-
deed, it may well be the instruments that produce the phenomenon in the first 
place. And instruments are nothing but theories materialized. The phenomena 
they produce bear the stamp of theory throughout (BACHELARD, 1984, 
p.13).7 
                                                             
5  Cf. HENRY (1995), and also PÊCHEUX (1995c) in which he gives an overview of his own 
development. 
6  Translations without a reference to a published translation, such as this one, are ours. The 
original text is: “Il ne s’agit rien moins que de la primauté de la réflexion sur l’aperception, 
[...]. Nous aurons à montrer que ce que l’homme fait dans une technique scientifique de 
[l’époque contemporaine] n’existe pas dans la nature et n’est même pas une suite naturelle 
des phénomènes naturels” (BACHELARD, 1949, p.103). 
7  “Alors il faut que le phénomène soit trié, filtré, épuré, coulé dans le moule des instruments, 
produits sur le plan des instruments. Or les instruments ne sont que des théories matériali-
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As shown by CANGUILHEM, who took over BACHELARD’s chair in 
epistemology at the École Normale Supérieure, the process of conceptualisa-
tion and “scientificisation”, of breaking away from “error”, is not confined to 
the transition from common sense to science, but goes on within science itself. 
His notion of a continuous breaking away from “error” became an important 
element of ALTHUSSERism. ALTHUSSER’s point was that, in order to estab-
lish itself as the science of history and society, MARXism must liberate itself 
from “idealism” in a continuous struggle. This is the context in which ALT-
HUSSER and his students worked on a study of the “conditions of production” 
of MARX’s Capital (cf. ALTHUSSER & BALIBAR, 1970). 
PÊCHEUX’s scientific career began within this intellectual climate, which 
introduced a feel for the historical and practical context of scientific concepts 
and “discoveries”. Among his first publications are a summary of the concepts 
of BACHELARDian epistemology (PÊCHEUX & BALIBAR, 1969), a lecture 
on the different effects of the “Galilean break” in the fields of physics and 
biology (PÊCHEUX, 1969b), and two articles on the theoretical conjuncture in 
thesocial sciences (PÊCHEUX, 1969c, 1969d)8. Together they give a clear im-
pression of the drives behind PÊCHEUX’s approach to discourse analysis. 
PÊCHEUX and BALIBAR (1969)9 describe an “epistemological break” as a 
point of no return from which a science begins to exist. They emphasise that  
the concept of break has nothing to do with the voluntaristic idea of a jump 
from ideology into science, with its inevitable implicit religious connotations. 
The name of Galileo in ‘the Galilean break’ is in fact a misnomer, because sci-
                                                                                                                                
sées. Il en sort des phénomènes qui portent de toutes parts la marque théorique” (BACHE-
LARD, 1937, p.12). 
8  BACHELARD developed his epistemology by studying the history of natural sciences such 
as physics. CANGUIL-HEM widened this approach by studying life sciences such as bio-
logy. Subsequently, ALTHUSSER and FOUCAULT applied epistemological concepts to 
the history of the social sciences. PÊCHEUX was the first in this tradition who studied the 
present conjuncture in the social sciences. He had been working in this field since 1966, 
when he obtained, with the support of CANGUILHEM, a research position in the laborato-
ry for social psychology of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (C.N.R.S.). 
9  In fact, PÊCHEUX and BALIBAR do not claim to be the “authors” of this text. It is pre-
sented as a summary of alecture presented by François REGNAULT, which, for unclear 
reasons, could not be published (PÊCHEUX & BALIBAR, 1969, p.7). REGNAULT’s lec-
ture was part of a “philosophy course for scientists” organised by ALTHUSSER at the 
École Normale Supérieure in the winter of 1967-1968. This course consisted of the follow-
ing contributions (ALTHUSSER, 1990, p.71; WOLF, 1985, pp.155-156): ALTHUSSER, 
Introduction (5 lectures); MACHEREY, The empiricist ideology of the “scientific object” 
(3); BALIBAR, From the “experimental method” tothe practice of scientific experimenta-
tion (3); REGNAULT, What is an epistemological break? (1); PÊCHEUX, Ideology and 
the history of the sciences (2); FICHANT, The idea of a history of the sciences (2); BA-
DIOU, The concept of the model (2). More lectures had been announced but the series en-
ded when the “events” of May 1968 occasioned BADIOU to not continue his lectures. Part 
of the lectures has been published: ALTHUSSER (1990, pp.69-165), BADIOU (1969), 
FICHANT and PÊCHEUX (1969). 
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ence is not the product of a single human being: Galileo represents the effect 
rather than the cause of the epistemological break that carries his name.10 
PÊCHEUX and BALIBAR outline three effects of the epistemological break 
that constitutes a science. The first of them is that specific pre-existing ideo-
logical and philosophical discourses are explicitly dismissed: the new science 
breaks away from them. A second effect is that retroactively some philosophies 
are validated and others invalidated: the break redefines the values within a 
conflict-laden philosophical field. A third effect is the relative autonomy of the 
new science: its further development depends primarily on its experimental 
practices and on theoretical events rather than on influences from outside. This 
last effect implies that an epistemol ogical break is a unique event in the history 
of a science. Subsequent theoretical displacements cannot be designated with 
the term “break” (PÊCHEUX & BALIBAR, 1969, p.12). 
In his contribution to ALTHUSSER’s “philosophy course for scientists”,11 
PÊCHEUX (1969b) analyses how a conflict between two theoretical ideologies 
develops differently within the fields of physics and biology. In physics the 
“Galilean break” led to a triumph of mechanistic explanations of magnetism 
and electricity over the animistic experience of wonder. PÊCHEUX draws 
special attention to the use of the word “dynamic” as opposed to “static”, which 
inaugurates the new field of electrodynamics. Contrastively, in a “transversal 
analysis”, he shows that in biology the opposition between “dynamic” and 
“static” became connected with the distinction between physiology and anat-
omy. Here the introduction of the term “dynamic” did not lead to mechanistic 
interpretations, but to the development of vitalistic perceptions of “forces”, 
which are still conceived as animate. PÊCHEUX links this divergence between 
physics and biology to differences between the social practices connected with 
these sciences: physics is applied mainly to the field of the means of production 
(e.g. machines), whereas biology, through medicine, is applied to the field of 
labour (humans). 
In two other publications of the same year, PÊCHEUX does not make ex-
plicit use of epistemological concepts, but his approach is clearly BACHE-
LARDian. In an article on the conjuncture of social psychology, he states that 
this discipline is haunted by (the struggle between) two kinds of ideology—a 
biopsychological one on the “biological” side of psychology and a set of politi-
cal, religious and moral ones on the “social” side of psychology (PÊCHEUX, 
1969c, p.291). These ideologies rely on an unexplicated, ideological concept of 
                                                             
10  “[...] le concept de rupture n’a rien à voir avec le projet volontariste d’effectuer un ‘saut’ 
hors de l’idéologie dans la science, avec la connotation religieuse qui s’attache inévitable-
ment à ce projet, et les impossibles ‘héros de la science’ qu’il implique. Le nom de Galilée 
[...] est une unité mal choisie, car une science n’est pas le produit d’un seul homme: Galilée 
est l’effet, et non la cause, de la coupure épistémologique que l’on désigne sous le terme de 
‘galiléisme’” (PÊCHEUX & BALIBAR, 1969, pp.10-11). 
11  See Note 9. 
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the “subject”, which should be transformed theoretically by a critical applica-
tion of psychoanalysis and Marxism.PÊCHEUX conceives this transformation 
not as something merely philosophical but rather as a difficult enterprise whose 
realisation implies profound transformations in research practice. It is a “theo-
retical intervention from the philosophical terrain into the practical work that is 
done by researchers in social psychology”.12 
In a contribution to a discussion among communists on how to influence the 
development of the human sciences, PÊCHEUX (1969d) emphasises the 
BACHELARDian theme of the conceptual difference between (pre-scientific) 
“experience” and (scientific) “experimentation”: “We must take issue with the 
idea that there are primary “givens” from which theories could start: it must be 
stressed that a scientific problem can only exist within a conceptual and in-
strumental-experimental field”.13 In the same article we find a quite different 
theme as well, namely a critique of the ideological uses of formalisation, such 
as in CHOMSKYan linguistics:  
We must make a distinction between those cases in which mathematics is ap-
plied technically and other cases in which it intervenes at a theoretical level 
between concepts and experimental devices. (An example of the latter would 
be generative and transformational grammars.)14 
In generative and transformational grammars, formalisation is not merely a 
technical application of mathematics. Formalisation intervenes at a theoretical 
level. It represents the ideological conception that language is formal. Accord-
ing to PÊCHEUX, the critique and abandonment of empiricism and formalism 
is not merely a philosophical task—though Marxist philosophy will play a 
part—, it is rather a practical matter of political intervention in the institutions 
of research and education.15 
                                                             
12  “l’intervention […] des points théoriques […] hors du champ philosophique, dans le travail 
effectif des chercheurs en Psychologie Sociale” (PÊCHEUX, 1969c, p.297). 
13  “Nous pensons qu’il importe [...] de prendre parti contre l’idée qu’il y a des ‘données’ 
premières à partir desquelles on imaginerait des théories: il importe de souligner qu’un pro-
blème scientifique se pose toujours dans un champ conceptuel et instrumental-
expérimental” (PÊCHEUX, 1969d, p.75). 
14  “Une tâche urgente est donc de parvenir à distinguer les cas où les mathématiques sont 
l’objet d’une application technique et ceux où elles interviennent au niveau théorique, entre 
concepts et dispositifs expérimentaux. (On pourrait avancer comme exemple de ce dernier 
cas l’apparition des grammaires génératives et transformationnelles ...)” (PÊCHEUX, 
1969d, p.76). 
15  The political orientation of PÊCHEUX’s work is in many respects similar to the work of 
Ernesto LACLAU (cf. LACLAU, 1981, LACLAU & MOUFFE, 1985), who likewise at-
tempts to theorise “the social” in the light of the irremediable loss of past certainties—
though without PÊCHEUX’s stress on linguistics. For a comparison of PÊCHEUX with 
other “marxist linguists” (GRAMSCI and VOLOŠINOV), see HELSLOOT (1995a). 
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3. Discourse Theory and Linguistics  
PÊCHEUX’s work discussed so far clearly demonstrates his immersion in 
epistemology and his application of ALTHUSSERian notions to an analysis of 
the state-of-the-art of the social sciences, but it does not throw much light on 
how this BACHELARDian background relates to his interest in discourse 
analysis. At this point, some indications can be found in two articlesthat 
PÊCHEUX published under the pen name of Thomas HERBERT. In his very 
first publication (HERBERT, 1966), PÊCHEUX applies BACHELARDian and 
ALTHUSSERian concepts to the social sciences, in particular to social psy-
chology. His diagnosis is that these sciences have not established themselves as 
proper sciences, because they have not established their own theoretical object. 
In other words, they have not accomplished the necessary epistemological 
break with ideology. These “sciences”, therefore, do not produce scientific 
knowledge but reproduce the ideology of the social system. In line with the 
epistemology of BACHELARD, CANGUILHEM and ALTHUSSER, 
PÊCHEUX claims that, in order to become proper sciences, the social sciences 
must go through a theoretical transformation in which both their objects and 
their instruments should be redefined. Whereas the current practice of the “so-
cial sciences” consists of transforming (ideological) discourse into other (ideo-
logical) discourse, social science proper would transform that discourse into 
something else, which would be expressed in terms of a new theory. 
PÊCHEUX presents discourse analysis as a social scientific instrument that 
should be defined in terms of the social scientific theory that is yet tobe estab-
lished. For PÊCHEUX, the development of an instrument of discourse analysis 
thus was explicitly not a merely technical enterprise. On the contrary, it was 
part of the project of establishing a truly scientific social psychology. 
In his sequel to the HERBERT (1966) article (HERBERT, 1968), 
PÊCHEUX gives the following succinct summary of its main thesis: “any 
science is initially the science of the ideology with which it breaks”.16 In this 
second HERBERT article, PÊCHEUX outlines the preliminaries of a “general 
theory of ideologies”, which would make possible a scientific study of how 
ideologies function. Such a theory is necessary for an understanding both of 
how ideologies can function as obstacles for the establishment of a science and 
of how they can be supersededthrough an epistemological break. For this pur-
pose, PÊCHEUX makes a distinction between two forms of ideologies: “em-
pirical” ideologies (which have technical origins) and “speculative” ideologies 
(which have political origins). At this point, he introduces linguistic terminol-
ogy to characterise the different ways in which these two forms of ideologies 
function:  
                                                             
16  “… tout science est principiellement science de l’idéologie dont elle se détache” (HER-
BERT, 1968, p.74). 
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The empirical form refers to the relation between a signification and a reality, 
whereas the speculative form refers to the articulation of significations to each 
other, under the general form of discourse. When we use terms imported from 
linguistics, we can say that the empirical form of ideology puts forward a se-
mantic function—the coincidence of the signifier and the signified—, whereas 
its speculative form puts forward a syntactic function—the connection of sig-
nifiers to each other.17 
The ideological process must be understood as a combination of the seman-
tic effect and the syntactic effect. The first effect produces the reality of the 
signified, whereas the second assigns it its proper place between all other 
things that can be present in discourse in the given ideological conjuncture. 
The “social sciences” are blind to the speculative functioning of ideologies 
because they approach discourses with only empirical means. This approach 
leads to a technical interpretation of speculation, which overlooks its effects 
within the empirical approach itself. 
The two HERBERT papers outline the questions to be addressed by 
PÊCHEUX’s automatic discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is aimed at a 
description of the functioning of ideologies in general, and of how this func-
tioning is an obstacle for the establishment of a real social science in particular. 
In this context, linguistics provides some essential concepts. PÊCHEUX 
uses the term “metaphor” for the semantic production of reality, and he calls 
the syntactic relations between signifiers “metonymical”. These terms hint at 
PÊCHEUX’s indebtedness to structuralism, which had become popular through 
the influence of Roman JAKOBSON on Jacques LACAN and Claude LÉVI-
STRAUSS. The reputed founder of structuralist linguistics was Ferdinand de 
SAUSSURE. A preoccupation with SAUSSUREan linguistics was widespread 
in France in the 1960s (in particular in “post-structuralist” circles). However, 
SAUSSURE’s Cours de linguistique générale was more quoted than actually 
studied. SAUSSURE was generally seen as the founder of structuralism, which 
was conceived primarily as a rigid and one-sided method.18 According to this 
view, the object of SAUSSUREan linguistics was langue (the language) as a 
system of formal relations—in isolation of its use, its history and its content, 
which were referred to the domain of parole (speech). “Post-structuralists” 
tried to adhere to the (supposedly SAUSSUREan) structuralist method while 
                                                             
17  “[L]a forme empirique concerne la relation d’une signification et d’une réalité, cependant 
que la forme spéculative concerne l’articulation de significations entre elles, sous la forme 
générale du discours. Pour user de termes importés de la linguistique, on dira que la forme 
empirique de l’idéologie met en jeu une fonction sémantique—la coïncidence du signifiant 
avec le signifié—, cependant que sa forme spéculative met en jeu une fonction syntaxi-
que—la connexion de signifiants entre eux” (HERBERT, 1968, p.79). 
18  This received interpretation, which was inaugurated by Charles BALLY and Albert  
SECHEHAYE, the editors of the Course, and which still prevails, is disputed in re-readings 
of SAUSSURE’s work by GODEL (1957), ENGLER (1967-1974), DE MAURO (1972), 
STAROBINSKI (1979), MARINETTI and MELI (1986), and HELSLOOT (2003). 
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counteracting its one-sidedness.19 In the footsteps of the anthropologist LÉVI-
STRAUSS (e.g. 1969), their work was directed to problems in other disciplines 
than linguistics: LACAN directed his analysis to the structure and workings of 
the unconscious; DERRIDA’s work focused on philosophical and literary 
analysis; FOUCAULT’s observations on language and discourse were part of 
his historical analysis of the present. 
PÊCHEUX addressed the question of the theoretical place of “discourse” 
within the SAUSSUREan model. His problem was that such questions as 
“What does this text mean?” were systematically excluded from linguistic 
analysis. Their solution was presupposed and, thus, leftto the self-evidences of 
everyday experience. According to PÊCHEUX, it was precisely this “leaving 
uncovered the territory” by linguistics, without its reoccupation by another 
science, that allowed ideologies to invade that terrain (again). In other words, 
though linguistics had established itself as a science through a “SAUS-
SUREean” epistemological break, it had “forgotten” to develop an adequate 
theory of meaning production in discourse. 
Within the “post-structuralism” of that time, PÊCHEUX’s project was 
unique for two reasons that are intimately related: he wanted to establish a 
social scientific theory of “discourse”, and he emphasised the need of develop-
ing an instrument for creating experimental (vs. experiential) results (cf. 
HENRY, 1995). His emphasis on the need of developing an empirical alterna-
tive to linguistic “speculation”, with its implied stress on both theoretical and 
analyticrigor, induced PÊCHEUX to a much more intensive study of (SAUS-
SUREan) linguistics than was common among his fellow-philosophers. This 
study was necessary in order to find theoretical room within linguistics for the 
concepts of “meaning” and “discourse”, and in order toconstruct a scientific 
instrument for the analysis of these objects. PÊCHEUX’s ADA69 presents the 
results of this study. 
4. Automatic Discourse Analysis  
ADA69 starts from a criticism of traditional forms of content analysis and text 
analysis (PÊCHEUX, 1995a, pp.63-71 [PÊCHEUX, 1969a, pp.1-8]). Such 
analyses presuppose a subject (the analyst or his coders) capable of “reading” 
the meaning of a text. PÊCHEUX wanted precisely to avoid this reliance on the 
reading subject, because it would inevitably produce an ideological reading. 
However, it must be acknowledged that the role of “intuitive reading” was a 
matter of concern for content analysts as well. In the same year (1969), for 
instance, KRIPPENDORFF stated that  
                                                             
19  Especially DERRIDA, in much of his work, comes close to a reinvention and radicalisation 
of tendencies that can already be found in SAUSSURE’s courses. 
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[...] traditional content analysis may be said to have presented a technique for 
reliably intuiting content rather than analyzing it. However, when modern 
content analysts take the word ‘analysis’ in its literal sense and use, for exam-
ple, computers for compatible interpretation of text, no part of the procedure 
can be delegated to the inexplicable process of intuition. [...] The explication 
of intuitively obvious semantic interpretations and judgments constitutes the 
most formidable obstacle in computer applications (KRIPPENDORFF, 1969, 
p.6). 
Though this problematisation of intuitive reading was quite similar to 
PÊCHEUX’s criticism, the solutions proposed were very different. One solu-
tion in content analysis was the construction of dictionaries in which entry 
words were defined with one or more “tags” representing categories in the 
investigator’s theory. The prime example of this approach is The General In-
quirer (STONE, DUNPHY, SMITH & OGILVIE, 1966). A different solution 
was to restrict the analysis to formal aspects of the studied texts only, i.e. to 
those kinds of analysis that do not presuppose interpretation. This approach 
resulted in a proliferation of lexicometric studies. These different solutions 
have in common that they are blind to the question that is primary 
toPÊCHEUX: the question of how “meaning” and the “subject” are produced 
in discourse. 
Central to PÊCHEUX’s approach is the concept of conditions of production 
of discourse. Taking JAKOBSON’s model of communication as a starting 
point, he “sociologises” this model by requiring that the two subject positions 
in the model—the position of speaker/writer and that of listener/reader—be 
interpreted as locally and temporally specific imaginary positions. What mat-
ters is the place that each of them attributes to itself, to the other and to the 
“referent” (the object of which they speak). Such positions are imaginary, not 
in the sense of being “unreal” but of being related to images which produce 
material effects. The protagonists are not “free” in the choice of these images, 
which depend on structural relations (such as between worker and boss) and on 
what is said earlier and/or elsewhere. Such restrictions account for the relative 
stability of discourse through different occasions. This implies that “meaning” 
is more or less stable through such occasions, but that it changes when the 
conditions of production change, which is the case, e.g., when the same speaker 
speaks to another person or to the same person on a different subject. 
Whereas PÊCHEUX’s theory of the conditions of production of discourse 
may appear as a more or less straightforward application of ALTHUSSERian 
concepts to JAKOBSON’s model, his next step is more daring. This step con-
sists of reintroducing the SAUSSUREan theory of value, which explains the 
meaning of words by their relations to all other words of the language, and 
applying it to the conditions of production of discourse. The meaning of words 
in a discourse (i.e. in a text or utterance) is explained by their relations to other 
words that are not said: words that could have been said but were not, words 
that were said previously (either on the same occasion or on other occasions), 
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and words that could not be said. This interrelatedness between words is what 
PÊCHEUX calls “metaphoric” relations, and their meaning-effect is called a 
metaphoric effect (see PÊCHEUX, 1995, pp.96-100 [PÊCHEUX, 1969a, 
pp.29-33]). He outlines a theory of meaning as an effect of metaphoric relations 
(of selection and substitution) which are specific for (the conditions of produc-
tion of) an utterance or a text. This theory of meaning is the bedrock of his 
instrument for (automatic) discourse analysis. 
Before outlining the main features of PÊCHEUX’s automatic discourse 
analysis, it is to be recalled that it was his aim to develop an instrument that 
would produce experimental results (i.e. results which are the product of a 
theory-driven practice) as opposed to experiential results (i.e. results which are 
based on everyday experience). In order to study the meaning of discourses, he 
had to construct an instrument that required discourses (not meanings) as its 
input, and that would have information about the meaning of those discourses 
as its output. In other words, the instrument must construct metaphoric rela-
tions without the analyst “feeding” it with information about the experiential 
meaning of the words that build up these discourses. 
A method of discourse analysis that was outlined by the American linguist 
Zellig S. HARRIS (1952) provided PÊCHEUX with an instrument capable of 
doing exactly this: “We were fascinated by Harris, because we felt that he 
could offer something that would allow to escape both merely intuitionist her-
meneutic positions and positivistic ‘lexicometric’ positions”.20 It was HAR-
RIS’s aim to extend descriptive linguistics beyond the limits of the sentence. 
He therefore proposed to focus on a sequence of sentences or a text, and to 
conduct a formal analysis in terms of recurring patterns among its constituent 
elements. All assumptions about pre-given meanings of the elements, as well as 
all references to discursive sequences beyond the text in question, were ex-
cluded (cf. MARANDIN, 1979, pp.34-45; THOMPSON, 1983, p.217). Pre-
cisely because of this exclusion of pre-given meanings, HARRIS’s method of 
discourse analysis fitted PÊCHEUX’s need of a formal instrument. But, con-
trary to HARRIS, PÊCHEUX didnot exclude discursive sequences occurring in 
other texts. Because it was PÊCHEUX’s aim to construct a field of metaphors, 
i.e. of words that could have been in the discursive sequence under analysis but 
were not, he used the formal discourse analysis of HARRIS to relate sequences 
within a corpus of texts instead of sequences within one text. 
In order to guarantee the formal character of HARRIS’s method, i.e. to pre-
vent the tacit (re)introduction of “self-evident” meanings, it had to be made 
“automatic”. But in what sense is ADA69 “automatic”? In fact, it is not “auto-
matic” at all. Or, rather, it is as “automatic” as, say, instruments in astronomy 
                                                             
20  „Man war fasziniert von Harris, weil man fühlte, da war etwas, das es erlaubte, aus einer 
sowohl rein intuitionistischen hermeneutischen wie auch aus einer positivistischen ‚lexiko-
metrischen’ Position [...] herauszukommen“ (PÊCHEUX, interviewed in WOETZEL & 
GEIER, 1982, p.389). 
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and in physics. Like such instruments, automatic discourse analysis requires a 
very specific kind of input (which must be constructed as an input for the in-
strument) and it produces results that have meaning only within a very specific 
theoretical frame. The input of ADA69 is constructed in two subsequent steps, 
which are called the phase of corpus construction and the phase of linguistic 
analysis respectively. The third step then is automatic discourse analysis 
proper. But the output of this third phase does not consist of findings. The 
“findings” of an ADA69 procedure become available only through an interpre-
tation of the results of this third phase. It is precisely this requirement of theo-
retical intervention, before and after the use of the “automatic” instrument 
(which itself is defined in terms of the theory), which allows for a scientific 
(re)occupation of the field of semantics. 
The aim of automatic discourse analysis is to provide the analyst with a 
metaphoric matrix that gives information about the production of meanings 
under theoretically specified conditions of production. The first phase of 
ADA69, that of corpus construction, consists of delineating the object of study 
(“Which conditions of production are to be studied in this analysis?”), and of 
selecting the set of texts or utterances that, according to the theory, represent 
those conditions. This set of texts is called the corpus. The metaphoric matrix 
must be constructed from the elements (words) that constitute this corpus. The 
second phase of ADA69, the phase of linguistic analysis, consists of rewriting 
all sentences of the corpus in a standard format, which is required for their 
being used as input for the phase of discourse analysis. This rewriting is called 
“linguistic analysis” because it consists of a form of syntactic parsing and be-
cause this parsing is done according to a linguistic theory. The internal cohe-
sion of the separate texts of the corpus is preserved in this phase by attaching 
symbols to pairs of sentences which represent the connections between these 
sentences. 
The “linguistic analysis” phase of ADA69 is an application of the “SAUS-
SUREan” idea that the language is a system that is shared by a community (a 
nation or a culture) and that the theory of such a language, linguistic theory, 
can be treated as a neutral, formal device in an instrument of discourse analy-
sis. This instrument produces metaphoric matrices from a standardised input, 
irrespective of the specific kind of linguistic analysis that has produced that 
input. There is no theoretical preference for a specific type of linguistic analy-
sis. The theory of ADA69 requires that the input to the third—discourse ana-
lytic—phase has a standard format, which forms the basis for the construction 
of metaphoric matrices in this phase. But there is no discourse theoretical rea-
son for the choice of a specific format. This choice is a linguistic one. In practi-
cal terms, however, the technical details of the phase of discourse analysis 
proper are dependent on the format of its input. And, more important, the re-
sulting metaphoric matrices, called semantic domains, are constructed accord-
ing to substitutions of words in places (within that format) that are defined by 
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the linguistic theory underlying this format. The choice of linguistic theory, 
thus, has practical consequences. In other words, although different linguistic 
formats (resulting from different linguistic theories) require technically differ-
ent treatments in the phase of discourse analysis which can result in partially 
different outcomes, ADA69 does not provide criteria that justify the choice of a 
specific linguistic format.21 
The term “automatic”, in sum, refers to the formalised character of 
PÊCHEUX’s method. There are no “automatic” findings. ADA69 produces 
outcomes in a formal way, but they remain simplyoutcomes that must be inter-
preted. In his 1969 book, PÊCHEUX only mentions this final phaseof interpre-
tation of the results (see PÊCHEUX, 1995a, p.118 [PÊCHEUX, 1969a, p.110], 
wherehe introduces the concept of “reading”). Later, the difficulties that 
PÊCHEUX encountered inthis phase inspired him to make revisions of his 
theory (which are documented in PÊCHEUX, 1995b, pp.175-183 [PÊCHEUX, 
1969a, pp.70-77]). The revisions occasioned by difficulties in interpreting the 
results of ADA69 are an excellent example of the BACHELARDian theory 
regarding the role that theoretically constructed instruments play in the devel-
opment of a science. 
5. Limitations and Adaptations  
PÊCHEUX’s 1969 book was a theoretical book. It presented a theory of dis-
course and meaning production, and outlined an instrument based on this the-
ory. But ADA69 did not present results of the proposed procedure, because the 
instrument was not “built” yet. 
In the following years, PÊCHEUX constructed such an instrument. This re-
quired further work in two respects. On the one hand, the algorithms that could 
produce the metaphoric matrix in the phase of discourse analysis were imple-
mented in computer programs (see GADET et al., 1995). On the other hand, 
the linguistic phase was refined in a “manual” (HAROCHE & PÊCHEUX, 
1972). After the instrument ADA69 proposed in PÊCHEUX (1969a) had been-
actually built, the first empirical work with it was done (GAYOT & 
PÊCHEUX, 1971; PÊCHEUX& WESSELIUS, 1973; PÊCHEUX et al., 1979). 
The actual analyses confronted PÊCHEUX with new problems. At the same 
time, ADA69 was discussed critically in the linguistic literature (PROVOST-
CHAUVEAU, 1970; TROGNON, 1972; FISHER & VERON, 1973). Both 
these criticisms and his own experiences in using the instrument resulted in a 
revision of the theory, and in changes in the procedures of automatic discourse 
analysis. 
                                                             
21  Yet, PÊCHEUX justifies his choice for a specific standard format extensively (PÊCHEUX, 
1969a, pp.39-86). The details of this discussion are superseded by later developments 
within linguistics, among them developments towards automatic parsing that are treated by 
LECOMTE, LÉON and MARANDIN (1984). 
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In this period (1969-1975), PÊCHEUX was working on Les Vérités de La 
Palice (PÊCHEUX, 1975 [1982a]). This book was published in the same year 
as the ADA75 article in which therevisions of ADA69 are discussed 
(PÊCHEUX & FUCHS, 1975 [PÊCHEUX, 1995b]). In bothpublications, 
PÊCHEUX reconsidered the relationship between ideology and language, 
and—as a consequence—the relationship between discourse analysis and lin-
guistics. Those publications, however, were directed to different audiences. 
The book can be seen as a sequel to the two HERBERT articles from the 
1960s. It discussed problems of semantics, ideology and Marxist philosophy 
for a philosophically oriented audience, whereas the ADA75 article 
(PÊCHEUX & FUCHS, 1975), which discussed the same theory in relation to 
technical matters of discourse analysis, was written for an audience of empiri-
cal researchers. Yet, the two publications presuppose one another: results of 
automatic discourse analysis are used as examples in the book, which functions 
in its turn as a theoretical background for the discussionin the ADA75 article 
(PÊCHEUX & FUCHS, 1975). 
In this period of “thematization of uneven intrication” (cf. PÊCHEUX, 
1995c, pp.237-238 [1990, pp.297-298]), PÊCHEUX did not radically change 
the actual procedures of automatic discourse analysis. What changed were the 
theoretical underpinnings of the whole enterpriseand, correspondingly, the 
interpretation of its results: PÊCHEUX now explicitly introduced the AL-
THUSSERian theory of ideology and LACANian psychoanalysis into his the-
ory, which allowed him to theorise asymmetries between discourses. Moreover, 
he explicitly addressed the problem of the interpretation of the results of auto-
matic discourse analysis (i.e. of metaphoric matrices) by distinguishing be-
tween different effects of metaphoric relations: they maybe either relations of 
synonymy or “oriented” relations (PÊCHEUX, 1995b, p.165 [PÊCHEUX & 
FUCHS, 1975, p.61]). Because ADA69 was based on the assumption of stable 
conditions of production, it could not theoretically account for “ideological 
struggle” in terms of discourse. In 1969, PÊCHEUX’s conception of the meta-
phoric matrix had included only relations of synonymy (e.g. the president/De 
Gaulle) and opposition (e.g. De Gaulle/the workers), but the produced matrices 
contained relations between elements that could not be interpreted that way 
(e.g. strike/the workers). The latter kind of relation is now defined as being 
oriented: one term is the origin, the source, or the argument of the other (e.g. 
the workers begin a strike). This relation is not an explicit part of the discourse 
studied, but tacitly presupposed by it. In other words, we see here the influence 
of another discourse within the one studied. By theorising this influence, 
PÊCHEUX introduced a true innovation into the theory of discourse: his theory 
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of interdiscourse, defined as the “complex whole in dominance” of conditions 
of production of discourse.22 
Neither ADA69 nor ADA75 were designed for studying the workings of in-
terdiscourse, which was conceived as external to the (stable) conditions of 
production that were assumed. After1975 it became increasingly clear to 
PÊCHEUX that this was a serious drawback of the theoryunderpinning 
ADA69. This brought him back to the study of linguistics (GADET & 
PÊCHEUX, 1981) and of the analytical tradition of Gottlob FREGE and 
Ludwig WITTGENSTEIN (PÊCHEUX, 1984).23 These studies resulted in a 
serious criticism of extant linguistic theoriesof grammar and semantics. In his 
last, unfinished article (GADET, LÉON & PÊCHEUX, 1984), for instance, 
PÊCHEUX discusses differences in meaning-effect between sentences that, 
according to transformational-generative grammar, have the same deep struc-
ture. It appeared to be impossible to adapt ADA69 to these new theoretical 
requirements. At the beginning ofthe 1980s, PÊCHEUX virtually abandoned 
it.24 This abandonment, however, does not imply a rejection of the possibility 
of designing other instruments of automatic discourse analysiscorresponding to 
new theoretical standards. PÊCHEUX stuck to the BACHELARDian idea that 
the construction of instruments and the production of experimental results are 
necessary to the development of a science. He remained, therefore, very much 
interested in experimenting with recently constructed software (DEREDEC) as 
a tool for parsing sentences (through a recognition grammar) and in ways of 
using the results of this linguistic analysis as an input to other (discourse ana-
lytic) procedures.25 
6. Deconstruction of Linguistic Theories  
ADA69 started from the assumption that the production of meaning-effects can 
be explained by metaphoric relations within a discourse conceived as an iso-
lated whole in which substitutions are systematically regulated. At the time of 
ADA75, the limitations and adaptations of this approach gave cause to conceiv-
ing the substitution of discursive elements as an effect of heterogeneity rather 
than coherence and systematicity. A discourse was now conceived as affected 
by several, mutually different, discursive formations involved in unequal power 
relations. The irremediable heterogeneity and equivocality brought about by 
relations, including struggle, between different discourses within a dominant 
                                                             
22  Cf. PÊCHEUX (1982a, pp.113-118 and 184-193 [1975, pp.146-153, 240-250]). See on this 
book HOUDEBINE (1976); see also WOODS (1977), MACCABE (1979), COUSINS 
(1985), and MACDONELL (1986, pp.43-59). 
23  He also started to reread Friedrich NIETZSCHE (cf. HENRY, 1995, p.34, note). 
24  This process is documented in PÊCHEUX et al. (1982) and PÊCHEUX (1995c). 
25  LECOMTE, LÉON and MARANDIN (1984) gives a glimpse of DEREDEC’s possible uses 
for discourse analysis. 
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whole tend to be obscured in linguistics by appeals to “evident” presupposi-
tions or innate ideas. In order to develop a method for describing such rela-
tions, an “interdiscursive” domain had to be taken into account which was 
conceived of as the linguistic “outside” of single discourses. 
The exploration of the theoretical primacy of alterity and difference over 
identity, of “the other” over “the same”, did not only disqualify appeals to 
linguistic axioms; it also made problematic a mere revision of ADA69, or an 
appeal to other formalised procedures of discourse analysis. Thus, the themati-
sation of the heterogeneity of discourse resulted in a lack of new method. This 
may have been due to the theoretical and practical problems inherent in finding 
homogeneous and stable procedures for describing an object conceived of as 
heterogeneous and unstable. But it can also be explained by a new style of 
working. From 1976 to 1983, PÊCHEUX did not search for a new, monolithic 
method, but tried to practice linguistics as a way of challenging existing self-
evidences. 
A first step towards this new style was made in PÊCHEUX (1975), in which 
he repeated his earlier conclusion that the self-evidence of “objective” mean-
ings and the self-evidence of “subjective” positions of those who deal with 
meanings are equally problematic. Whereas, however, in ADA69, he limited 
himself to the development of an instrument allowing to circumvent the ideo-
logical self-evidences of the analysing subject, this time, he reflected on the 
possibility of a non-subjective position for the analyst himself or herself. Sub-
jects by definition identify with positions within interdiscoursive struggles 
between “dominant” discourses and counterdiscourses. Because analyses nour-
ished by ideological self-evidences cannot be considered scientific, a scientific 
analysis is to be produced independently of subjects. In other words, the break 
with ideology requires a process without a subject. This requirement implies a 
disidentification of the subject, which is a political task implicitly added to the 
epistemological need of an automatic instrument. 
Later on, however, PÊCHEUX (1982b) distanced himself from this hope for 
desubjectification, largely for the same reasons for which he distanced himself 
from ADA69. Like he had to reject unproblematic, homogeneous conceptions 
of meaning, he also had to abandon the all tooenthusiastic hope for a pure, 
desubjectified, subject position. PÊCHEUX’s new style, provoked by his eye 
for the complexities of both interdiscourse and being an analyst, is manifest in 
an illuminating way in his introduction to the proceedings of the conference 
Matérialités discursives, which took place in 1980. The discourse analyst 
doesn’t know anything anymore, he writes, not even what “reading” is. One 
has to “act silly, that is to say: decide to know nothing about what one reads, to 
remain a stranger to one’s own reading, to exaggerate systematically the spon-
taneous disintegration of the sequences, so as to rescue the verbal material from 
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even the last remains of meaning that still adhere to it”.26 On first sight, 
PÊCHEUX thus seems to embrace a merely disidentificatory conception of 
meaning, realising a total dispersion of the initial univocality of discourse and 
of the subject. However his analytic drive is still manifest in continuous safe-
guards against absolute relativisations of meaning. His aim to smooth the way 
for an adequate understanding of ideological struggle remains in full force.  
We are not, therefore, talking about a multiple or plural way of reading in 
which a subject playfully increases the number of possible points of view to 
recognize itself more easily, but about a way of reading that is subordinate to a 
multi-layered and heterogeneous corpus, a way of reading the structure of 
which changes dependently upon this reading itself. This kind of reading im-
plies that the reading subject accounts for the meaning it deciphers while, at 
the same time, loosing itself through it. After all, the interpretation follows the 
inter-discursive traces, which are preconstructed and transversal themselves.27 
In discourse analysis, readings are not arbitrarily “invented”. They are 
aimed at tracing the interdiscourse, which is socially given (preconstructed): 
“What is discussed time and again is the discursive analysis of a sequence with 
regard to an interdiscursive corpus of socio-historical traces”.28 The analytic 
possibilities which are left seem to come down to continuing such traces by 
engaging in interdiscourse.29 
This consideration of the problems of discourse analysis raises more ques-
tions than it provides answers (see especially PÊCHEUX, 1995c, pp.240-241 
[1990, pp.300-301]). PÊCHEUX tries to develop an approach which, on the 
one hand, does not fall into the (sociologistic) assumption that the unity of the 
language is a mere illusion produced by political and social institutions, and 
which, on the other hand, does not “forget” the political, social and even poeti-
cal dimensions of language (as is done in logicism). GADET and PÊCHEUX 
(1981) elaborate on the question of whether such a two-sided approach is pos-
sible at all. They elaborate on a reading of SAUSSURE in which the language 
                                                             
26  “Faire l’imbécile: c’est-à-dire décider de ne rien savoir de ce qu’on lit, de rester étranger à 
sa propre lecture, d’en rajouter systématiquement sur le morcellement spontané des 
séquences, pour achever de libérer la matièreverbale des restes de sens qui y adhèrent en-
core” (PÊCHEUX, 1981a, p.16). 
27  „Es geht also nicht um ein mehrfaches Lesen, um eine plurale Lektüre, in der ein Subjekt 
spielerisch die möglichen Standpunkte vervielfacht, um sich darin besser zu erkennen, son-
dern um ein Lesen, das einem mehrschichtigen und heterogenen Korpus untergeordnet ist 
und dessen Struktur sich in Abhängigkeit von diesem Lesen selbst verändert. Das ist eine 
Art der Lektüre, in der das lesende Subjekt den Sinn, den es entziffert, zugleich verantwor-
tet und von ihm enteignet ist. Denn die Interpretation folgt den interdiskursiven Spuren, die 
als solche vorkonstruiert und querlaufend sind“ (PÊCHEUX, 1983, p.54). 
28  „In Frage steht jeweils die diskursive Analyse einer Sequenz hinsichtlich eines interdiskur-
siven Körpers sozio-historischer Spuren“ (PÊCHEUX, 1983, p.55). 
29  Cf. LACLAU (1996, p.56): “[T]he impossibility of a free, substantial subject, of a con-
sciousness identical to itself which is causa sui, does not eliminate its need, but just relo-
cates the chooser in the aporetical situation of having to act as if he were a subject, without 
being endowed with any of the means of a fully fledged subjectivity.” 
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is conceived as a system of differences “without positive terms”.30 Within this 
scope, the work of CHOMSKY is critisised because of its logicism. This criti-
cism particularly touches on the way CHOMSKY deals with ungrammatical 
sentences—which occur quite frequently in everyday language use. What is the 
status of grammatical rules if they can be violated with impunity every now 
and then? (GADET & PÊCHEUX, 1981, pp.152-173). Neither logicism nor 
sociologism leave enough play for heterogeneity and “ungrammaticality”. 
Either approach is reigned by “the order of the serious”. In this respect, 
CHOMSKYan linguistics can be put on a par with Stalin’s unificatory lan-
guagepolitics (GADET & PÊCHEUX, 1981, pp.101-104; cf. GADET, 1977). 
In his contribution to the conference Matérialités discursives, PÊCHEUX 
(1981b) links the way of writing of two literary authors (BORGES and 
JOYCE) to the inclusive and exclusive effects that can be ascribed to com-
pound sentences.31 In the analysis of complex sentences, in some cases, an 
utterance (e.g. a “restrictive” clause) is seen as included within another utter-
ance. In other cases, the inserted utterance is interpreted as an apposition, 
which remains separate. Along these lines, PÊCHEUX distinguishes between a 
“writing of interpolation” and a “writing of disengagement”. The first, “narcis-
sistic” way of writing (which he finds in BORGES) maintains the reign of “the 
same”. Grammar remains fully intact and applicable; discursive equivocalities 
and contradictions are presented as interpretative puzzles within the logical 
space of grammar. In the second, more differential and “split” way of writing, 
discursive breaks make themselves directly felt in the expression itself through 
“juxtaposed utterances” with implicit connections, nominal sentences, inter-
rupted or partially swallowed sentences, and grotesques accumulations and 
enumerations bristled with “ill-matched spouses”.32 
In accordance with this distinction, PÊCHEUX (1982c) shows that linguistic 
attempts to get rid of interdiscourse present themselves in many forms.33 Again 
and again, one attempts to analyse language as a simple “play within the rules”, 
                                                             
30  SAUSSURE (1983, p.118; 1972, p.166); GADET and PÊCHEUX (1981, pp.51-59) relate 
this theme explicitly to SAUSSURE’s research of anagrams (STAROBINSKI, 1979). Cf. 
GADET’s later work on SAUSSURE (GADET, 1987). On the anagrams, see also HEL-
SLOOT (1995b). 
31  The distinction between the preconstructive and sustaining effects (effet de soutien) of 
language is alreadypresent in PÊCHEUX (1975). It is borrowed from HENRY (1975), who 
shows that the linguistic decision whether a subordinate clause is restrictive or nonrestric-
tive depends upon a prior non-linguistic interpretation of themeaning of the sentence. In 
PÊCHEUX’s terms, the distinction can only be made if one of these readings is “evident” 
within the interdiscourse. 
32  “[...] d’énoncés juxtaposés aux connections implicites, de phrases nominales, de phrases 
interrompues ou partiellement effacées, d’accumulations et d’énumérations grotesques où 
pullulent les ‘conjoints mal assortis’” (PÊCHEUX, 1981b, p.147). 
33  CHOMSKY is one of the outspoken examples of this exclusion; he speaks of the “system 
of knowledge and beliefs” rather than interdiscourse, see GADET and PÊCHEUX (1981, 
p.165). 
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which leads inescapably to hypostatising certain discursive rules, presented as 
“natural” and “logical”. Instead, PÊCHEUX formulates the necessity of a lin-
guistics theorising language as a “play with the rules”:  
The attempt to think of the language as a sphere of rules intrinsically capable 
of play, as a play with the rules, implies assuming within the language an or-
der of rules that is neither logical nor social; it implies hypothesizing that syn-
tax as a specifically linguistic sphere is neither a logical machine (an autono-
mous formal system, detached from the lexical, the semantic, the pragmatic 
and the enunciative) nor a fictitious metalinguistic construction (reducible to 
power effects inscribed in a mastery that would control written discourse).34 
Such a conception of language may contribute to finding forced displace-
ments in the possible interpretations of grammatical structures that are logically 
stabilised by linguistics. So, PÊCHEUX’s discourse analytic partiality for 
silliness may get the challenging bearing  
that one would have to put pressure on constructions so as to enlarge the gaps, 
create new points of coagulation and run upon points where zones of resis-
tance reveal themselves: to experience what we have called ‘the impossibility 
within language’ (GADET et al., 1984, p.33). 
7. Conclusion  
The epistemological problematisations presented by PÊCHEUX in his work on 
discourse analysis stay far from giving a “hard” basis to the social sciences. 
The analyst keeps getting stuck in formulations of contradictions one would 
rather like to avoid: logicism versus sociologism, seriousness versus play, 
linguistics versus poetry, heterogeneity versus homogeneity, interpolation 
versus disengagement. Yet, PÊCHEUX convincingly defends such contradic-
tions against the compulsiveness towards unity displayed by the main trends in 
the social sciences (including linguistics). 
We hope to have demonstrated that also in the problems he raises, 
PÊCHEUX does more than draw impracticable consequences from merely 
theoretical premises. His theorising is accompanied by the construction of an 
instrument and the production of experimental results. This makes his work not 
only relevant as a contribution to the history of discourse theory and discourse 
analysis, but shows, in an exemplary manner, the nature of the obstacles, both 
in terms of theory and of method, encountered in any possible form of dis-
course analysis. The transition towards a sophisticated theory of discourse and 
                                                             
34  “Tenter de penser la langue comme espace de règles intrinsèquement capables de jeu, 
comme jeu sur les règles, c’est supposer dans la langue un ordre de règle qui n’est ni logi-
que, ni social: c’est faire l’hypothèse que la syntaxe comme espace spécifiquement linguis-
tique n’est ni une machine logique (un système formal autonome, extérieur au lexical, au 
sémantique, au pragmatique et à l’énonciatif), ni une construction fictive de nature métalin-
guistique (réductible à des effets de pouvoir inscrits dans une maîtrise supposée gouverner 
lediscours écrit)” (PÊCHEUX, 1982c, p.23). 
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a scientific method of discourse analysis is a matter of both forcing an “episte-
mological break” with empiricist conceptions of meaning and of producing the 
corresponding experimental results. This requires a renewed confrontation with 
the problem of how to develop a scientific practice of discourse analysis—
aproblem acutely defined by PÊCHEUX and not satisfactorily addressed to 
date. 
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